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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-New Mexico Rejects
Prosecutorial Goading as Test for Double Jeopardy BarState v. Breit
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Breit,' the New Mexico Supreme Court expanded the state
constitutional protection against double jeopardy to prohibit the reprosecution of a
defendant when the court grants the defendant's motion for a retrial, mistrial or
reversal of a conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct. The supreme court
broadened the doctrine beyond the federal approach by applying double jeopardy
even if the prosecution did not intend to force the defendant to request a new trial but
did act in willful disregard of the defendant's right to a fair trial.'
Breit changed the New Mexico double jeopardy law standard as applied to
prosecutorial misconduct in criminal cases. Previously, the state rule, which was
similar to the federal rule, barred reprosecution in situations where the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct intended to precipitate a defense motion for a mistrial.3 The
federal standard requires that a defendant prove that the prosecutor intended to
"goad" the defendant through misconduct to move for a mistrial.4 The Breit court
chose to afford the defendant more double jeopardy protection by imposing a higher
standard under the New Mexico Constitution-in effect eliminating the need for the
defendant to prove the subjective intent of the prosecutor as required by the federal
standard. Instead of using the "goad" standard, the Breit court focused on the
prosecutor's "willful disregard" of the defendant's right to a fair trial.5 This note
reviews New Mexico and United States Supreme Court decisions relevant to the
issue of prosecutorial misconduct, examines the rationale of Breit, and discusses the
significance of the Breit decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1993, a jury convicted Foster James Breit (Breit) of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon and first-degree murder.6 At the initial trial, Breit and his counsel
chose to hear the jury verdict despite their beliefs that the prosecutor had behaved
inappropriately throughout the trial.' After the jury announced the guilty verdict,

1. 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792 (1996). Several opinions were written by various courts during the course
of this litigation. Throughout this Note, Breit refers to the supreme court opinion, while Breit Slip Opinion refers to
the district court opinion, State v. Breit, No. CR-88-175, slip op. (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 1990).
2. See id.
3. See State v. Day, 94 N.M. 753, 617 P.2d 142 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980).
4. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
5. See Breit, 122 N.M. at 666, 930 P.2d at 803.
6. See id. at 658,930 P.2d at 795. On September 1, 1988, Foster James Breit went to his neighbor's home,
where his estranged wife had moved, to try to perade her to reourn to him. Plaintiff-Appellee State of New Mexico's
Answer Brief at 8, State v. Breit, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792 (1996) (No. 21,954). Breit, who smelled strongly of
alcohol, told his estranged wife to pack her belongings, but she refused. See id. Before leaving the home Breit told
Oscar Hill who was in the home, that he would be back. See id. Hill, making a motion with a gun, told Breit not to
return if he had been drinking. See id. Later that day, Breit returned with a shotgun and killed Oscar Hill who was
sitting in his chair watching television. See id. at 9.
7. During the first trial, before the case went to the jury, Breit expressed great concern to the trial judge about
the prosecutor's actions and indicated that the only proper solution might be the granting of a mistrial. See id.
However, because he had already endured the ordeal and expense of the entire trial, he chose to hear the jury's
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Breit filed a motion for a new trial.8 The trial court granted Breit's motion because
the prosecutor had engaged in extreme misconduct.' Thereafter, Breit filed a motion
to dismiss all the charges on double jeopardy grounds.'" The trial court granted this
motion by memorandum opinion." The state responded by asking the trial court to
reconsider the dismissal. The trial court denied the state's motion.12 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal, explaining that a new trial
would not violate the defendant's double jeopardy rights. 3 Breit appealed to the New
Mexico Supreme Court but that court denied certiorari. 4 In the second trial for the
imprisonment. 5 Breit then
same charges, Breit was convicted and sentenced to life
16
Court.
Supreme
Mexico
directly appealed to the New
In turn, the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed Breit's appeal and decided to
base its decision upon the state constitution's prohibition of double jeopardy. The
court decided to interpret state law to provide greater protection than that guaranteed
under the federal constitution and ruled that Breit should not have been forced to
endure another trial after the trial court had granted his motion to dismiss.
III. HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Double Jeopardy Interests
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution reads in part, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to

verdict. See id.
8. See id. at 660, 930 P.2d at 797.
9. See id. at 658, 930 P.2d at 795. The Memorandum Opinion authored by the trial judge and attached to
the supreme court opinion included the prosecutor's remarks to the jury. See id. at 667, 930 P.2d at 804.
The court determined that the prosecutor painted defense counsel as an accomplice to perjury. See Breit,
122 N.M. at 673, 930 P.2d at 810. The prosecutor said that "all of this [goes] to this story that was rehearsed,
rehearsed, rehearsed, with six lawyers." Id. at 672, 930 P.2d at 809. The prosecutor also said, "I've got a great idea.
Why don't I get mad at somebody, go over and murder them, and then I'll hire six lawyers, they'll put together a case,
we'll claim self-defense." Id. at 673, 930 P.2d at 810. The prosecutor went on to say "[lt is not up to the state to show
self-defense. That is a legal theory concocted by the defendant and his lawyers to sell to you." Id. The prosecutor later
said,
And then to sit there and say, "Oh, by the way, we don't have to prove a thing." Well, they don't.
They don't. You can sit back and you can watch the evidence that we put on. And that's fine.
[And that's fine.] That's fine with me. But you can also look at the absurdity of this fantasy woven
in front of you ....
Id. Lastly, the prosecutor said, "Who is on trial here, that's the question, and that's what it boils down to. I mean,
whose idea was it to cook up a story of self-defense?" Id. at 674, 930 P.2d at 811.
10. See id. at 658, 930 P.2d at 795.
11. State v. Breit, No. CR-88-175, slip op. (N.M. Dist. Ct. Sept. 12, 1990).
12. See id. at 2.
13. See Breit, 122 N.M. at 658, 930 P.2d at 795.
14. See Breit v.State, No. 20149, cert. denied, 113 N.M. 1, 820 P.2d 435 (1991).
15. See Breit, 122 N.M. at 658, 930 P.2d at 795. Breit was retried by a jury for first degree murder and
aggravated assault on December 13, 1993. Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 2, State v. Breit, 122 N.M. 655,
930 P.2d 792 (1996) (No. 21,954).
16. See Breit, 122 N.M. at 658, 930 P.2d at 795. Appeals from the district courts in which there is a sentence
of death or life imprisonment are to be taken directly to the Supreme Court. See N.M. R. App. P. 12-202(A)(1). See
also N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2. In reversing Breit's life sentence, the court emphasized that although it originally
denied Breit's petition for certiorari, that did not mean that the Court of Appeals mandate denying Breit's motion to
have all of the charges against him dismissed on double jeopardy grounds was correct. See Breit, 122 N.M. at 659,
930 P.2d at 795.
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be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....
The New Mexico Constitution in
similar wording also protects citizens against double jeopardy. 8
1. Individual Interests
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from:
reprosecution after acquittal; reprosecution after conviction; separate punishments for
the same offense and sometimes from reprosecution after an aborted trial. 9 The basis
for protecting the defendant from the state stems from the Supreme Court's belief
that the states, with resources that in many cases dwarf the defendant's, should be
forbidden from making repeated attempts to convict an individual. 20 The court
reasoned that if an individual did not have double jeopardy protection, that person
would be subjected to the "embarrassment, expense and ordeal and... a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
2
innocent he may be found guilty." '
2. Societal Interests
The fundamental principle behind the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the state
should be prevented from oppressing an individual through abuses of the criminal
process. 22 The Supreme Court has recognized that the general rule barring retrial on
the same charge by the same sovereign after jeopardy has attached may be relaxed
in three different situations: 1) when the defendant has successfully appealed his
conviction or otherwise managed to have his conviction overturned; or 2) when the
trial judge dismisses the case against the defendant prior to the verdict; or 3) when
the judge declares a mistrial.23
Specifically, the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Jorn2 that the bar
against double jeopardy is not absolute. 2 Sometimes a defendant will have to
undergo several trials because the Fifth Amendment "does not guarantee a defendant
that the Government will be prepared, in all circumstances, to vindicate the societal
interest... [in] a single proceeding for a given offense." 26 Additionally, in observing

17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. The New Mexico Constitution provides:
No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; and when the indictment, information or
affidavit upon which any person is convicted charges different offenses or different degrees of the
same offense and a new trial is granted the accused, he may not again be tried for an offense or
degree of the offense greater than the one of which he was convicted.
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
19. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §30.01

(3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter WHrEaRE.AD].
20. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
21. Id. at 187-88.
22. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 42 (1988) (acknowledging that the Double Jeopardy Clause
aims to prevent governmental oppression); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) ("At
the heart of [the double jeopardy] policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to
a second trial for the same offense would arm Government with a potent instrument of oppression.").
23. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 19, §30.03.
24. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
25. See id. at 484.
26. Id. at 483-84.
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that reprosecution is allowed when a defendant wins a reversal on appeal of a
conviction, the Supreme Court has stated that the defendant's double jeopardy
concerns do not extend so as to compel society to "be prepared to assure the
27
governmental or judicial error."
defendant a single proceeding free from harmful
28
Justice Harlan, in United States v. Tateo, noted that, as a matter of practical
necessity, double jeopardy generally does not prohibit the retrial of a defendant after
the reversal of his conviction on appeal: "It would be a high price indeed for society
to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect
'9
sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction.
In instructing appellate courts on double jeopardy, the Supreme Court cautioned
that overzealousness on their part in protecting "against the effects of improprieties"
at the trial or pretrial proceedings could place an accused person irrevocably beyond
the reach of further prosecution if the double jeopardy clause were interpreted to
prohibit retrial."0
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that striking a balance between society's needs
and an individual's rights with regard to double jeopardy is an ongoing process,
requiring state and federal courts to periodically revise the standard used in assessing
when double jeopardy bars further prosecution. It is in this context that the New
Mexico Supreme Court decided Breit.
ProsecutorialRole
One of the vehicles by which society's interests are protected and its laws enforced
is the prosecutor. The role of the prosecutor in criminal cases is not merely to enforce
societal rules but also to ensure justice for both the state and defendant. In Berger v.
United States,"t the Court detailed the duties of a prosecutor as:
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
conviction as it is to
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
3
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. "
Eihically, the prosecutor is also obligated to protect the innocent as well as to
convict the guilty.33

B.

27. Id. at 484.
28. 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
29. Id. at 466.
defendant's
30. See id.See also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 682 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The
and fair
full
one
prosecutor
the
affording
in
interest
society's
against
balanced
be
interest in finality ... must
(1978) ("[The
opportunity to present his evidence to the jury."); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505
to the public
defendant's] valued right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate
jury.").
impartial
an
to
evidence
his
present
to
opportunity
fair
and
full
one
prosecutor
the
affording
in
interest
31. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
32. Id. at 88.
33. See American Bar Ass'n Standards of Criminal Justice (3d ed. 1992).
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C.

The Supreme Court Standard
In Oregon v. Kennedy,'4 the United States Supreme Court ruled that no matter how
egregious, a prosecutor's misbehavior at trial will not bar a subsequent retrial so long
as the prosecutor did not act with the specific intent to deprive the defendant of the
protection of the double jeopardy clause, and the defendant did not object to the
mistrial.35 To apply the bar, the prosecutor's primary motivation for such "goading"
must be to obtain a second chance to try the defendant to obtain a "more favorable
opportunity to convict."36 In circumstances where the defendant moves for a mistrial,
retrial, or reversal of a conviction, it is the defendant's burden to prove that it was the
prosecutor's motive to force the defendant to do so."
Prior to Kennedy, the Supreme Court, in dictum, suggested a range of factors to
gauge whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and retrial should be barred. 8
The factors formally considered by the Supreme Court were proof of bad faith,
harassment, or prejudice by the prosecutor that led the defendant to move for a
mistrial-any one of the factors were sufficient to bar a retrial.39 The Court also
considered any oppressive practices on the part of the prosecutor. 4° After Kennedy,
the Court narrowed the bar to reprosecution, specifically looking to whether the
prosecutor intended to cause the retrial. The Court chose not to concentrate on the
egregiousness of the prosecutor's overall conduct at trial, preferring instead to focus
on the prosecutor's intent.41 The Kennedy Court reasoned that this prosecutorialintent standard was preferable in situations involving prosecutorial misconduct
because a more general test "would permit a broader exception" and could have a
"chilling effect" on the prosecution. 42 The Supreme Court added that this narrower
standard was also more "manageable ' 3 because it "merely calls for the court to make

34. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
35. See id at 669. The United States Supreme Court inKennedy based its decision on the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. See id. at 671. During Kennedy's trial for theft, the state's expert witness, who
testified during direct examination concerning the value of the stolen property, admitted on cross-examination that
he had once filed a criminal complaint against Kennedy, but that no action had been taken by authorities on the
complaint. On redirect, the prosecutor tried to establish why the witness had filed the complaint, but the defense
repeatedly and successfully objected to her questions. After having elicited from the witness that he had never done
business with the defendant, the prosecutor asked, "Is that because he is a crook?" Id. at 669. After the statement,
the trial court granted respondent's motion for a mistrial. See id.
36. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 684 n.13 (quoting Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)).
37. See id. at 683-684.
38. See Green v. U.S., 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
39. See generally United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976) (holding that the trial court's expulsion
of a lawyer from the courtroom, leaving co-counsel unprepared to continue, was insufficient to bar retrial on double
jeopardy grounds because the trial court was not committing acts of misconduct in that it did not banish the lawyer
with the intention of goading the defendant into requesting a mistrial or to prejudice his prospects for an acquittal).
40. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,689 (1949) (finding that a trial may be discontinued and a retrial would
not be barred on double jeopardy grounds when particular circumstances manifest a necessity for so doing and when
failure to discontinue would defeat the ends of justice).
41. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-76.
42. Id. at 674. The prosecutor's role in trial "is designed to 'prejudice' the defendant by placing before the
judge or jury evidence leading to a finding of his guilt." Id.
43. Id. at 675.
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a finding of fact" as to the prosecutor's intent based on available objective facts and
circumstances.4 5
In Kennedy, four members of the United States Supreme Court disagreed with the
plurality, contending that the Kennedy test would seldom be met because it would be
difficult for a defendant to prove that the prosecutor intended by deliberate
misconduct to provoke a mistrial and not merely to prejudice the defendant." Justice
Stevens wrote a concurring opinion which identified circumstances that would fall
outside the Kennedy rule:
For example, a prosecutor may be interested in putting the defendant through the
embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of criminal proceedings even if he cannot
obtain a conviction. In such a case, with the purpose of harassing the defendant
the prosecutor may commit repeated prejudicial errors and be indifferent
between a mistrial or mistrials and an unsustainable conviction or convictions.
Another example is when the prosecutor seeks to inject enough unfair prejudice
into the trial to ensure a conviction but not so much as to cause a reversal of that
conviction. This kind of overreaching would not be covered by the Court's
standard because, by hypothesis, the prosecutor's intent is to obtain a conviction,
not to provoke a mistrial. Yet the defendant's choice-to continue the tainted
proceeding or to abort it and begin anew-can be just as "hollow" in this situation
as when the prosecutor intends to provoke a mistrial.47
Justice Stevens believed that double jeopardy should bar reprosecution when "the
court is persuaded that egregious prosecutorial misconduct has rendered
unmeaningful the defendant's choice to continue or to abort the proceeding." '
State Criticisms of the FederalLaw
Several states have rejected the Supreme Court's narrow standard barring
reprosecution when interpreting their own state constitutions.49 The states have
reasoned that occasionally prosecutors, in bad faith, overreach or harass the
defendant with the intention of prejudicing his chance for acquittal.5 ° The most
notable rejection is the Oregon Supreme Court which, on remand of Oregon v.
Kennedy," chose not to follow the United States Supreme Court's rationale in
interpreting its state constitution double jeopardy bar. 2
D.

44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 688.
47. Id. at 689 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Arizona, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas are among the states that have published
opinions expanding the federal standard in assessing their own state constitutional double jeopardy bar. See generally
infra notes 51, 62, 71, 78 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., People v. Dawson, 397 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), affid, 427 N.W.2d 886 (Mich.
1988) (formally adopting a three part test to determine when to apply jeopardy); State v. White, 354 S.E.2d 324, 329
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987), affid, 369 S.E.2d 813 (N.C. 1988) (holding that the standard should be bad faith prosecutorial
overreaching or harassment aimed at prejudicing the defendant's chances for acquittal).
51. 666 P.2d 1316 (Or. 1983).
at 1325-26.
52. See id.
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1. Oregon
The Oregon court decided to adopt a broader interpretation of the double jeopardy
clause than afforded by the Supreme Court in Kennedy.53 Oregon concluded that the
Supreme Court decision would provide less protection to defendants in state criminal
proceedings than Oregon would permit under its state constitution.' The Oregon
court did not limit itself to the federal test because it decided that to do so would
result in punishment to prosecutors in that prosecutors would be sanctioned for
unlawful official conduct.5" The Oregon court explained that the objective of the state
double jeopardy provision is not to punish prosecutors but to protect the defendant
from reprosecution after a prosecutor's actions have left the defendant with no other
recourse but to request a new trial.56 In its ruling, the Oregon court interpreted its
state constitution to provide greater protection than Kennedy by creating a standard
of "'knowing' misconduct coupled with indifference"57 on the part of the
prosecutor.58 This interpretation was necessary, according to the Oregon court,
because the court wanted double jeopardy to attach to situations where improper
official conduct is so prejudicial to the defendant that the court would have to order
a mistrial. 59 The Oregon court determined that Kennedy would prevent retrial in these
situations." Additionally, the Oregon court stated that Kennedy also would not apply
in situations where the prosecutor did not intend to provoke the mistrial but knows
that the conduct is improper and prejudicial and is indifferent to the danger of a
resulting mistrial or reversal.6
2. Arizona
Two years after the Supreme Court decision in Kennedy, the Arizona Supreme
Court had to decide whether to interpret its state constitution consistently with the
federal constitution or to apply a broader rule.62 Like the Oregon state court, Arizona
chose to provide greater protection than the U.S. Supreme Court did in Kennedy.
Arizona noted that Kennedy would bar retrial in situations where the court permitted
53. See id. at 1325.
54. See id. at1326.
55. See id. at 1324.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 1327.
58. See id at 1323, 1326 (concluding that because the defendant's offense implicated state law, the Oregon
court could demand a different constitutional standard than that imposed by the United States Supreme Court in cases
arising out of the federal constitution).
59. See id. at 1326.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261 (Ariz. 1984). Pool involved a criminal prosecution for theft
where the prosecutor engaged in misconduct while cross-examining a witness. See id. at 265. The trial court found,
and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed, that the prosecutor: (I) made. irrelevant and prejudicial references to the
defendant's handling of a gun while intoxicated and to the defendant's drinking habits (who was not testifying); (2)
repeated questions objected to by the defense and sustained, thus exhibiting an impertinence to the court; (3) made
an argumentative, grossly improper and prejudicial remark in characterizing the defendant as a "cool talker" and
"good buddy" of defense counsel; (4) invited speculation and argument from a witness by asking him what he thought
of the evidence received or what evidence he expected to be introduced; (5) asked a witness to speculate on what type
of testimony the co-defendant would give after the co-defendant claimed his right not to testify under the Fifth
Amendment; and (6) suggested by question or innuendo unfavorable and unprovable matter which was not in
evidence and which was irrelevant. See id. at 265-66.
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a defendant be retried only if the defendant could prove (or a court sua sponte
determined) that the prosecutor intended to cause a mistrial by pursuing an improper
course of conduct.63 Kennedy, according to the court, would be insufficient to enforce
it could
the state constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy because
6' This is so,
crime.
same
the
intentionally expose the defendant to multiple trials for
defendant
said the court, since the defendant would be retried in situations where the
' 6' The court
error.
by
infected
chose to start anew rather than to complete a "trial
considered the burden of another trial arising from prosecutorial misconduct, while
not intended to force the defendant into moving for a new trial or to complete the
infected trial, would nonetheless result in a mistrial and destroy the66defendant's
expectation of completing the proceeding before the original tribunal.
While recognizing the need for uniformity in federal and state constitutional
interpretations, the Arizona court decided that it should not blindly follow federal
67
precedent in interpreting its state constitution. The court then barred another trial
under the state constitution when a mistrial is granted on a defendant's motion or
declared by the court under all of the following conditions: 1) because of improper
conduct or actions by the prosecutor; 6 and 2) when prosecutorial misconduct is not
a result of legal error, negligence, mistake or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as
be improper
a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows toor
reversal; 69
mistrial
of
danger
the
to
indifference
with
pursues
and prejudicial, and
and, (3) when the conduct causes70prejudice to the defendant which cannot be cured
by any means short of a mistrial.
3. Pennsylvania
7
A more recent criticism of Kennedy was Commonwealth v. Smith. ' Smith also
presented a situation where the prosecutor intentionally undertook to prejudice the
defendant to the point of denying him a fair trial despite the lack of prosecutorial
intent to provoke a mistrial.72
Before Smith, Pennsylvania had adopted the Kennedy prosecutorial intent
standard.73 However, in Smith the Pennsylvania court concluded that the Kennedy
intent standard was too narrow in the case before it because the prosecutor did not
63. See id. at 270.
64. See id. at 272.
65. Id. (quoting Kennedy, 666 P.2d at 1326).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 271.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 271-72. A prosecutor will not be absolved when he or she claims lack of experience. See id. at
270. "The law cannot reward ignorance; there must be a point at which lawyers are conclusively presumed to know
what is proper and what is not." Id..
70. See id.
71. 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992). Mr. Smith was sentenced to death for first-degree murder. See id. at 322. After
the conviction and sentencing, the defense discovered that the prosecutors had withheld potentially exculpatory
evidence during the first trial, and had knowingly denied that its chief witness had been given a favorable sentencing
agreement in exchange for testifying. See id. On appeal, the prosecutor intentionally suppressed the exculpatory
evidence while arguing in favor of the death sentence, and attempted to discredit the state trooper who had testified
at trial by stating that the trooper had "fabricated" and "planted" evidence. See id. at 322-24.
72. See id. at 325.
73. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 522 A.2d 537, 540 (Pa. 1987).
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intend to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial.74 Rather, the prosecutor's
intent was the opposite: to prevent the defendant from moving for a mistrial by
concealing how the defendant had been wrongfully convicted.75 The Smith court
reasoned that, if the federal Kennedy standard was applied in state cases where the
prosecution purposefully prejudiced the trial against the defendant, the defendant
could be reprosecuted in violation of his state-constitutional right to be free from
double jeopardy.76 Thus, the court concluded, double jeopardy should bar a new trial
in Smith because the Pennsylvania constitution gives greater protection to a
Pennsylvania defendant and applying Kennedy would "ris[e] to the level of
subversion of [the defendant's] constitutional rights."77
4. Texas
Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals expressed concern that applying
Kennedy would yield suspect results because the prosecutor's subjective intentions are
inherently unknown and Kennedy would leave unclear what standards of proof to apply
when measuring the intentional violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial.78 In the
Texas Court of Appeals decision (Bauder 1),79 the dissenting judge noted that using
intent to decide what the prosecutor actually intended at trial amounts to nothing more
than guesswork.80
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the appellate court decision,
agreeing with the dissenting judge. The court ruled that in Texas double jeopardy
bars reprosecution after a mistrial has been granted at the defendant's request, not
only when the objectionable conduct of the prosecutor was intended to induce a
defendant's motion for mistrial (applying Kennedy), but also when the prosecutor
was aware of and consciously disregarded the defendant's risk of being forced to

74.
75.
76.
77.

See Smith, 615 A.2d at 322.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 325.
[Tihe double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant not
only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a
mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the
defendant to the point of denying him or her a fair trial.

Id.
rev'd, 921
78. See Bander v. State, 880 S.W.2d 502,504 (Tex. App. 1994) (Butts, J., dissenting) [Bauder1],
S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) [BauderIII (refusing to apply Kennedy, and expressing approval of
the appellate court dissent). The defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated. See Bauder11, 921 S.W.2d
at 697. After the trial court had granted a motion in limine barring evidence of any uncharged misconduct by the
defendant, the prosecutor presented the arresting officer's testimony that when the appellant got out of the car, he was
barely able to stand and his pants were unbuttoned. See Bauderl, 880 S.W.2d at 503. The officer thought the driver
[The
and transportation for an intoxilyzer test. See id.
was intoxicated. See id. Additional testimony covered the arrest
prosecutor in eliciting testimony about an uncharged offense implying that the defendant was soliciting a prostitute]
asked [the officer] what appellant had been doing in the parked car before the alleged crime. See id. The officer
The prosecution
responded that the defendant was engaged in oral sex. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. See id.
argued for a curative instruction but the court granted the mistrial. See id.
79. Texas has different appellate courts: Texas Court of Appeals, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Texas
Court of Appeals (previously Court of Civil Appeals), and Texas Supreme Court. Criminal appeals from the Texas
Supreme Court are heard in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals which has statewide final appellate jurisdiction of
criminal cases. Death sentences imposed by the trial court are directly appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. See TEX.CONST.art. V, § 5.
80. See Bauderl, 880 S.W.2d at 504 n.l.
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move for a mistrial." The Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that Kennedy did not
provide as much protection as the Texas Constitution. The reason cited by the court
was that Kennedy did not make a distinction of "constitutional significance" as to
situations when the prosecutor intends to cause a mistrial or 2when the prosecutor
engages in such conduct that a mistrial is reasonably certain. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals also noted its preference that the prosecutor's subjective intent not
be at issue in determining whether or not to bar retrial because of the forecasted
ambiguity. 3 Thus, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, while continuing to apply
Kennedy, has allowed defendants in criminal trials an added protection against
double jeopardy.
New Mexico Law
The New Mexico Constitution protects any person from being "twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense."'" Under New Mexico law, double jeopardy "may be
raised by the accused at any stage of a criminal prosecution, either before or after
judgment."5 Furthermore, the New Mexico Supreme Court, prior to Breit,had ruled
that the double jeopardy clause in the New Mexico Constitution was subject to the
as its counterpart in the Fifth Amendment of the
same construction and interpretation
86
Constitution.
States
United
The U.S. Supreme Court decided Kennedy in 1982. It was not until 1996, with
Breit, that the New Mexico Supreme Court decided whether to follow the Kennedy
prosecutorial intent standard when interpreting the double jeopardy provision of the
New Mexico state constitution.8 7 New Mexico's position on double jeopardy and
prosecutorial misconduct prior to Breit followed Kennedy and barred reprosecution
in those situations in which the prosecutor engaged in any misconduct for the
purpose of precipitating a motion for a mistrial, gaining a better chance for conviction
upon retrial, or subjecting the defendant to the harassment and inconvenience of
successive trials."8
E.

IV. RATIONALE OF THE BREIT COURT
In State v. Breit, the New Mexico Supreme Court determined whether to apply a
9
narrow federal double jeopardy standard when interpreting the state constitution.
In doing so, the supreme court addressed a question of first impression in New
81. See id. at 699.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
85. Id.
86. See State v. Day, 94 N.M. 753, 756,617 P.2d 142, 145, (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980). New
Mexico applied double jeopardy to a case where the prosecutor, rather than risking an acquittal, purposely created
a situation necessitating a mistrial (or a reversal) to have a more favorable climate for conviction upon retrial. See id.
at 757, 617 P.2d at 146.
87. Cf State v. Aragon, 116 N.M. 291, 861 P.2d 972 (1993). The state supreme court decided not to consider
whether the Kennedy decision altered the state precedent in Day, and held that "even under the Day test" the trial
court "properly determined that the prohibition against double jeopardy did not bar a retrial." Id. at 296, 861 P.2d at
977.
88. See Day, 94 N.M. at757,617 P.2dat 147.
89. See Breit, 122 N.M. 655, 658, 930 P.2d 792,795 (1996).
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Mexico: Under the New Mexico Constitution, must the court conclude that the
prosecutor intended to cause a defendant to move for mistrial, retrial or reversal
before finding a legitimate double jeopardy violation?' In argument, the defendant
requested that the court adopt a modified standard of the double jeopardy bar
pursuant to Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution and not follow
Kennedy.91 The state argued that the court should apply the law of the case doctrine
and that the supreme court's denial of certiorari (from the appellate court decision)
prevented the court from addressing the issue of double jeopardy in Breit altogether. 92
The supreme court decided that it could hear the case because the law of the case
doctrine was not applicable being that its denial of certiorari was not an indication
that the appellate court ruling was correct.93
Before Breit, New Mexico followed the standard expressed in State v. Day9 which
was similar to Kennedy in that it barred reprosecution 9 in situations where "the
prosecutor engaged in any misconduct for the purpose of precipitating a motion for
a mistrial, gaining a better chance for conviction upon retrial, or subjecting the
defendant to the harassment and inconvenience of successive trials." 96 The Breit
court expanded Day in creating the prosecutor's willful disregard test. As
explanation, the Breit court added that Day should be interpreted as describing
"instances of misconduct in which the prosecutor acts in willful disregard of the
resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal on appeal."'
In deciding not to limit New Mexico state courts to the Kennedy precedent, the
supreme court stressed that state courts do not have to follow the federal rulings
blindly in applying state law. 9 However, it recognized its boundaries in noting that
it is obligated to follow United States Supreme Court decisions when deciding
matters stemming from the federal constitution."
The court noted that if it were to apply only the federal Kennedy standard, Breit's
reprosecution would not be barred.' ° The New Mexico Supreme Court discussed at
length other states' criticisms of the Kennedy decision, and the ability of state courts
to interpret their state constitutions utilizing federal decisions for guidance only.
However, the Breit court chose not to entirely disregard the United States Supreme
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id. at 660, 930 P.2d at 797.
See id at 663, 930 P.2d at 800.
See id. at 659, 930 P.2d at 796.
See id.
94 N.M. 753, 617 P.2d 142 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980).
N.M. CONST. art II, § 15.
Day, 94 N.M. at 757, 617 P.2d at 146.
Breit, 122 N.M. at 658, 930 P.2d at 795.
See also State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
[When this Court cites federal opinions... in interpreting a New Mexico constitutional provision
we do so not because we consider ourselves bound to do so by our understanding of federal or
state doctrines, but because we find the views expressed persuasive and because we recognize the
responsibility of state courts to preserve national uniformity in development and application of
fundamental rights guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions.
Id. at 436, 863 P.2d at 1057.
See e.g., State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 783, 932 P.2d 1,7 (N.M. 1997) (state courts may diverge from
federal precedent on basis of flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government or
distinctive state characteristics). See also infra note 107.
99. See Breit, 122 N.M. at 664, 930 P.2d at 801.

100. See id. at 667, 930 P.2d at 804.
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Court's ruling in Kennedy. Rather, the court chose "a narrow expansion"' 0 ' of the
federal standard established by Kennedy, rationalizing that the plurality of the United
States Supreme Court simply did not foresee the effects of misconduct of prosecutors
who do not subjectively intend to provoke a mistrial." 2 In this expansion, the court
decided that the prosecutor's intent, while important, should not be the only factor
in deciding whether double jeopardy bars retrial in a state case involving
prosecutorial misconduct. Instead, the court preferred to use the prosecutor's "willful
disregard" as the state standard in addition to prosecutorial intent.3
The court explained that, according to the case record summarized in the trial
court's memorandum opinion and append in its entirety to the supreme court
decision, the prosecutor in Breitengaged in various acts that would not individually
raise the bar to retrial."°4 However, the court concluded that in Breit's first trial the
misconduct was so unrelenting and pervasive that the trial was "out of control."'0 5
The supreme court, in barring retrial, applied a new "willful disregard" standard and
determined that under minimal legal, ethical and professional standards, the
prosecutor acted knowingly and intentionally and lacked "an underlying respect for
our system of justice.""
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
The New Mexico Supreme Court decision in Breit is another example of New
Mexico construing its state constitution to accord defendants more protections than
the federal courts, something the New Mexico state courts have done before."° Breit

101. Id.
102. See id. at 660, 930 P.2d at 797.
103. See id. at 666, 930 P.2d at 803.
The court chose the term "willful disregard" because it is a predominantly legal expression with
a well-developed jurisprudential meaning.., emphasizing that the prosecutor is actually aware,
or is presumed to be aware of the potential consequences of his or actions. The term connotes a
conscious and purposeful decision by the prosecutor to dismiss any concern that his or her conduct
may lead to a mistrial or reversal.
Id.
104. See id. at 668, 930 P.2d at 805.
105. See id. at 667-8, 930 P.2d at 804-5 (noting the trial court judge's opinion of the prosecutor's conduct).
There were many examples of the prosecutor's misconduct. In his opening, the prosecutor attempted to inflame the
jury with allegations that were irrelevant. When the trial court sustained objections, the prosecutor expressed sarcasm
and scorn toward defense counsel and the court. During witness questioning, the prosecutor engaged in improper
arguments with witnesses. The prosecutor directed belligerent remarks at opposing counsel and, had the defense
counsel objected at every opportunity, the defense would have been placed in the position of appearing to hamper
proceedings and hide evidence from the jury. During closing, the prosecutor belittled the defendant's fundamental
right to remain silent, and portrayed his right to counsel as a ploy to avoid punishment. Finally, in numerous
comments, he suggested that opposing counsel had engaged in pejury, lying and had collaborated with the defendant
to fabricate a defense. See id. 667, 930 P.2d at 804.
106. Id. at 668, 930 P.2d at 805.
107. For example, New Mexico has construed the state constitution's search and seizure provision to accord
defendants more protection than the federal courts. See Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994) (holding
that warrantless public arrest must be based upon both probable cause and sufficient exigent circumstances, rejecting
the more lenient federal rule requiring only probable cause); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993)
(holding that the good-faith exception to the federal exclusionary rule was incompatible with state constitutional
protections); State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211,784 P.2d 30 (1989) (refusing to follow the totality of the circumstances
standard when evaluating the validity of a search warrant based on an informant's tip); See also State v. Wright, 119
N.M. 559, 893 P.2d 455 (Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 119 N.M. 389, 890 P.2d 1321 (1995) (rejecting federal
doctrine of "apparent authority" to consent to search).
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significantly changed New Mexico law to bar reprosecution in situations where the
prosecutor engaged in willful misconduct to get another chance to convict the
defendant or when the prosecutor expressed a willful disregard for the defendant's
right to a fair trial by engaging in such misconduct during the trial." s Thus, the court
placed constraints on prosecutors and demonstrated its unwillingness to defer to
prosecutors by rejecting the intent-to-goad requirement used in federal constitutional
interpretation in state constitutional law analyses.
With Breit,New Mexico has armed the defendant in a criminal proceeding with
more double jeopardy protection than available under the federal constitution. The
defendant has the right to request a mistrial because of the prosecutor's willful
disregard for the defendant's right to a fair trial or because the prosecutor wanted
another bite of the apple in his or her efforts to convict. 10 9
The potential problem with Breit lies in the fact that the court never mentions
which party has the burden of proving what the prosecutor intended at trial. Rather,
the court merely applies the "test" to the case at hand and determines that a double
jeopardy bar exists in Breit."0 The court did mention that the defendant can raise the
issue of double jeopardy at any time during or after the trial but did not mention if
the defendant has the burden of proof.' However, the court noted that if the
defendant raises double jeopardy at trial, it is the trial court judge who is in the best
position to evaluate the prosecutor's credibility and record it for possible appellate
court review."' The court reasoned that this is so because the trial court, with the
court record at hand and with the testimony of the prosecutor and other pertinent
witnesses, would be in the best position to evaluate the prosecutor's credibility.' As
such, the reviewing court should refer to the trial court opinion and the court record
on the issue in assessing double jeopardy bars." 4
Another potential problem with Breit is that the New Mexico Supreme Court
declined to specifically define the term "willful disregard." The court chose instead
to explain that the term means nothing more than the prosecutor is actually aware, or
is presumed to be aware, of the potential consequences of his or her actions.1"
According to the court, the term connotes a conscious and purposeful decision by the
prosecutor to dismiss any concern that his or her conduct may lead to a mistrial or
reversal." 6 However, as an aid, the court did indicate that the "totality of the
circumstances at trial would be worth looking into to determine if the prosecutor
acted in willful disregard.""'
Nonetheless, the New Mexico Supreme Court's willingness to afford more double
jeopardy protection to defendants than the U.S. Supreme Court should be

108. See Breit, 122 N.M. at 666, 930 P.2d at 803.
109. See id.at 661,930 P.2d at 798.
110. See id.at 667, 930 P.2d at 804.
111. See id. at 659, 930 P.2d at 796.
112. See id. at 667, 930 P.2d at 804.
113. See id.
114. See generally id.
at 667-8, 930 P.2d at 804-5 (deferring to the conclusion of the trial judge who oversaw

the proceedings and was critical of the prosecution).
115. See id.
at 666,930 P.2d at 803.
116. Seeid.
117. Id. at 667, 930 P.2d at 804.
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commended as an effort that would have been supported by the late U.S. Supreme
Court Justice William Brennan.'1 8 In a rare law review article, Justice Brennan
warned that state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full
protections of the federal constitution because federal law should not be allowed to
inhibit the independent protective force of laws that states have enacted to protect its
citizenry." 9 According to Justice Brennan, without state constitutional law
interpretation, the full realization of guarantees afforded to citizens by the Bill of
Rights could no longer be guaranteed.' 2 Justice Brennan warned that it would be an
error for states to consider U.S. Supreme Court constitutional rulings as dispositive
of state constitutional issues.'
Breit demonstrates that New Mexico will continue to heed the advice of Justice
Brennan and will protect its citizens from prosecutorial over-reaching in criminal
cases. Further, this decision also reflects the supreme court's contention that a
charged person will not be convicted at the cost of his or her constitutional rights
regardless of the state's interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Breit decision held that the State may not retry a defendant after the
prosecutor engages in misconduct that displays the prosecutor's willful disregard for
the defendant's double jeopardy rights. The law in New Mexico is clear: this court
will not tolerate misconduct of this sort by prosecutors. With this decision New
Mexico reasserts its willingness to analyze the New Mexico Constitution
independently of federal precedent when state courts decide that federal law does not
adequately protect the state constitutional rights of New Mexico citizens.
ROSARIO DYANA VEGA

118. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489 (1977).
119. See id. at 491. Justice Brennan, as one of the last members of the liberal Warren court, subscribed to the
Warren sentiment that neither the states nor the federal governments should infringe the rights guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights and wrote the article in response to the recent conservative rulings of the Supreme Court. See id. at 489.
Although written twenty years ago, the Warren sentiment Justice Brennan imparted in his article is as applicable
today.
120. See id.
121. See id.

